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A CROWD OF GODS: ATHEISM AND SUPERSTITION IN JUVENAL,  
      SATIRE 13 
             JAMES UDEN 
This article proposes a fundamental reinterpretation of the thirteenth Satire of Juvenal 
and an argument for placing religion, as well as politics and poetics, at the forefront of 
our reading of his work. The poem is addressed to one Calvinus, who has deposited a 
small amount of money with a friend, but the friend perjured the oath he swore and stole 
the cash.1 In a long line of readings that go back to the 1960s, the Satire has been seen as 
a parody of a specific genre of philosophical writing, the consolatio. Calvinus suffers 
from a loss of money rather than some weightier complaint, and the speaker of the Satire, 
under the ironic cover of consolation, needles and provokes him to expose his pettiness 
and irascibility.2 These studies have established beyond doubt the poem’s formal 
inversion of the consolatio, but I think we can go further in the basic question of what the 
poem is about. In the interpretation advanced here, both speaker and addressee are the 
objects of critique. Their voices are polarized as opposed religious positions. Calvinus, 
not merely angry but harping on his friend’s impious perjury, embodies the 
“superstitious” individual in the specific ancient sense, who rushes to divine assistance 
for minor everyday troubles and lives in hope and fear of the gods’ punishment for 
human wrongs. The speaker of the poem, who assaults conventional piety by mocking 
Calvinus for his scruples, is the recognizable figure of the atheistic perjurer, who comes 
into clearest focus as a social type in Juvenal’s period. These two positions – the 
superstitious person and the atheist – are also opposed to one another in a 
contemporaneous Greek philosophical treatise, the De Superstitione of Plutarch. But, as 
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I’ll argue, whereas Plutarch himself represents a calm mediating voice in that treatise, 
Juvenal’s poem oscillates wildly between the two extremes, producing as satire a 
spectacle of uncompromising religious argument. A clear, direct message about pietas or 
fides remains unstated. The angry assertion of difference becomes its own grotesque 
display.  
 
The poem, which was published soon after 127,3 presupposes a world in which the 
question of what constitutes truly Roman religious practice has become increasingly 
complex.4 Juvenal contrasts the period of early Rome, when heaven was almost deserted 
and the gods ate lunch on their own, to the contemporary period, when there is, he says, a 
turba deorum, a “crowd of gods” (46).5 The phrase is part of a tradition: it is lifted from 
Seneca’s now-fragmentary On Superstition, which criticized “the entire ignoble crowd of 
gods [turba deorum] that long-standing superstition, over a long period of time, has 
massed together”.6 The idea that Rome has made even heaven crowded and over-
populated was common. Pliny the Elder complained that the Empire contained more gods 
than people.7 But turba deorum also evokes very well the heterogeneous, contentious 
religious world depicted here and throughout the Satires. Roman religion is characterized 
by the satirist less by the worship of particular gods than by sheer variety, by the traffic of 
religious options circulating within Rome and throughout the Empire. By Juvenal’s time, 
as Jörg Rüpke writes, “political, social, and especially religious status no longer coincide, 
and related identifications of elements of the symbolic system become fraught… The 
crucial aspect is no longer the actual origin of a practice, but its perception, and the 
anticipated perception of others”.8 Juvenal shows us a world where adulterous liaisons 
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take place at shrines of Isis, Peace, Cybele, and Ceres (listed together at 9.22-4); where 
the Roman consular Lateranus swears by the Gallic horse god Epona at the altars of 
Jove;9 where the satirist himself can casually invoke details of Egyptian cult while 
lamenting the disappearance of Roman virtus.10 The Satires do not insist emphatically on 
the worship of any particular god. They depict an Empire in which the old gods have 
become part of a crowd.  
 
How did the pressures of this competitive and contentious religious environment shape 
Juvenal’s satiric expression? Juvenal often describes the noise of religious worshippers in 
the city in terms that recall his own furious rhetoric. He derides the “freedom of speech” 
(libertas loquendi, 2.111-12) of Cybele worshippers and their fanaticus priest, a 
“memorable exemplum of a great throat” (memorabile magni/ gutturis exemplum, 113-4); 
he attacks the fanaticus devotee of the war-goddess Bellona (4.123-4), and the band of 
Galli making a “grand noise” (grande sonat, 6.517; cf. his own grande carmen, 6.636); 
he criticizes the women whipped into blazing passion (ardor) by the loud piping of the 
Bona Dea rituals (6.317; cf. the satirist blazing, ardeat, 1.45). These sorts of emphatic, 
totalizing religious identities become more prominent objects of critique as the poet’s 
own approach becomes more indirect, as the texts cloak their own individual speaking 
voice in a crowd of other impersonated voices.11 In Satire 14 he castigates the separatist 
Jewish community that teaches its children to “despise” (contemnere) Roman law (14.96-
106). In Satire 15 he adds to the typical parody of Egyptian theriolatry a depiction of 
frightful, hateful absolutism: “the height of furor among people on both sides”, he says, 
“because each place hates the god of its neighbors, though they each believe that only the 
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ones they worship should be counted as gods”.12 As has long been emphasized, the later 
poems of Juvenal veer off in a surprising direction to satirize the sort of anger that had 
been the satirist’s earlier stock-in-trade.13 Outrage itself is stigmatized. Loud, divisive 
religious voices in the later Satires – in this poem, the atheistic speaker and the 
superstitious Calvinus – therefore emerge as rhetorical antitypes, new sorts of outsider 
identities against which Juvenal articulates his own ironic, detached mode of critique.  
 
1. BACKGROUND: PETTY CRIME AND EXCESSIVE RELIGIOSITY 
The specific complaint of Calvinus in Satire 13 is not only that his money has been stolen 
but that the perpetrator is a perjurer (174-5), though here as elsewhere a contradiction is 
evident about appeals to the gods in everyday legal transactions. On one hand, there was 
a deeply felt Roman belief in the sanctity of oaths, and a conviction that perjurers would 
be punished by the gods. On the other hand, elite Roman and Greek texts, drawing from 
Hellenistic philosophy, promoted an ideal of the gods as beneficent but distant from 
human affairs, and castigated an over-dependence upon the gods in daily life as excessive 
religiosity and superstition.  Certainly there is ample epigraphic evidence that, in an 
Empire in which the mechanisms of the formal legal system were often ill understood, 
overly expensive, geographically remote, or slow, people turned to the gods to ensure that 
financial transactions would be upheld. The body of defixiones studied by H.S. Versnel, 
for example, contains curses against those who have stolen money, and prayers in which 
the gods are asked to intervene in financial and legal affairs to bring justice to the injured 
party.14 Roman legal texts also affirm the sanctity of oaths. The breaking of an oath was 
not in itself actionable at law, since it was up to the gods to avenge that wrong (Cod. Iust. 
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4.1.2). But perjury was seen as an affront to the god by which the oath was sworn, and a 
violation of the religious integrity of the community at large.15 A matter could be settled 
before the praetor by parties swearing an oath, since an oath has more “authority than the 
judgment of a court” (maioremque habet auctoritatem quam res iudicata, Dig. 12.2.2; 
Crook 1967, 76). Even in the earliest periods, “swearing an oath was considered and kept 
inviolable and sacred among the Romans”, or so Gellius claims (iusiurandum apud 
Romanos inviolate sancteque habitum servatumque est, 6.18.1). In fact, despite his 
cynical descriptions of the ubiquity of perjury in Rome, Juvenal himself insists with 
remarkable frequency upon the importance of oaths. The satirist complains that the oaths 
of the rich are always trusted, but the poor man is always disbelieved (3.144-46). In a 
miraculous Golden Age, the oaths sworn by Greeks could still be believed (6.16-8).16 The 
satirist asserts with unusual directness in Satire 8 that one should avoid perjury even if 
subject to torture, a moral duty as quintessentially Roman as being a good soldier, 
guardian and judge (79-82). A sign that an innocent child has matured into a wicked adult 
is when he starts “selling perjuries for a tiny sum” (14.216-9). The Satires’ repeated 
outrage over violated oaths springs from a deeply conventional sense that the 
preservation of fides was a cornerstone of Roman ethical behavior.17 
 
Further indirect support for the normative status of oaths in Juvenal’s period comes from 
other religious groups in the second-century Empire. In the New Testament book of Acts 
– persuasively dated to the late Trajanic or early Hadrianic period18 – J. Albert Harrill has 
shown that the fate of Ananias and Sapphira (Acts 5: 1-11) assumes an apologetic 
significance as an expression of harmony with the ethics of oath-keeping in Greek and 
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Roman culture. Ananias and Sapphira “lie to the Holy Spirit” by withholding part of their 
property from distribution among believers. As soon as their lie is exposed by the apostle 
Peter, they are instantly struck dead by the Lord. Harrill demonstrates that this is an 
attack on perjurers, since the language of the episode strongly suggests that the Christians 
swore an oath to share all property in common (2011, 366; cf. Acts 4.32). The emphasis 
on divine punishment for perjury therefore defends Christians from the contemporary 
Greco-Roman charge of atheism against their community, demonstrating to those outside 
of their faith that they too put stock in the sanctity of oaths.  Similarly, it is striking that 
early Christians in Bithynia, according to Pliny, swore an oath (sacramento) “not to break 
faith, not to deny a deposit when someone seeks its return” (ne fidem fallerent, ne 
depositum adpellati abnegarent, Ep. 10.96.7), the very same situation dramatized in the 
thirteenth Satire. The Christians’ vow is a curiously specific statement of adherence to 
financial ethics, but it makes best sense if we consider the importance of returning 
deposits in Roman culture, and the audience to whom this account of early Christian 
ritual practice aimed to appeal (Pliny, an elite Roman).19 In an apparent effort to uphold 
the sanctity of oaths in an ever-diversifying religious climate, the emperor Antoninus 
Pius, in a rescript preserved in the Digest, permitted people throughout the Empire to 
swear an oath in legal contexts “according to their own particular religion” (propria 
superstitione, Dig. 12.2.5.1). The crowd of gods swells, but an adherence to Roman 
financial and contractual ethics formed part of a bid for respectability for marginal 
religious groups in the second-century Empire.  
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In the rescript of Antoninus Pius, superstitio connotes “non-Roman” or at least “non-
traditional” worship, though, as Richard Gordon notes, it is unlikely that its use is 
pejorative, since the emperor is “interested only in ensuring the maximum authority for 
oaths, given their crucial role in contracts and law-courts”.20 Yet pejorative uses of the 
word were common. The sense of superstitio is different from our “superstition”, though 
its manifestations could be similar.21 Rather, superstition for the Roman denotes 
excessive or non-standard religious practice, characterized by fear rather than a reverence 
for the gods – the Greek is δεισιδαιμονία, “fear of the divine” – and contrasted with 
official, sanctioned forms of piety (religio).22 Although certain religions (Egyptian cults, 
Christianity, Judaism) were frequently characterized as varieties of superstition,23 it is 
important that the term lack any specific content. It is used to disparage any form of 
worship that falls outside the official religious policies controlled by the state.24 At the 
same time, different religious groups within the Empire could invoke the distinction 
between religio and superstitio to erect boundaries between their own individual forms of 
religious practice. So, for example, forms of δεισιδαιμονία are used in the book of Acts 
from a Christian perspective of Athenian religious practice (17:22), and then later from a 
Roman perspective of Jewish religious practice (25:19), so that the text’s own usage 
illustrates the rhetorical contingency of the term. Crucial to the accusation of superstition 
are always the interests and identity of the speaker, since the religious boundaries that the 
term seeks to uphold were subject to constant competition and change in the ancient 
world.   
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Roman verse satire, under influence from Hellenistic philosophy, targeted superstition as 
one of its comic vices. The genre’s canonical founder Lucilius mocked the gullibility of 
those who “think that all the inventions of dreams are true” and “believe that bronze 
statues can think and feel” (526-7W). Such people who “tremble” (tremit, 525W) at the 
images of the gods are just “like little children” (ut pueri infantes, 526-8W), since such 
images are nothing but “a picture gallery, devoid of truth, entirely made-up” (pergula 
pictorum, veri nil, omnia ficta, 529W). The Stoic preacher Stertinius in Horace, Satires 
2.3 mocks a woman suffering from “fear of the gods” (timore deorum), who vows to 
Jupiter that she will bathe her son naked in the Tiber if he recovers from a fever. If he 
does happen to recover, his mother will kill him with cold anyway as a result of her 
excessive, superstitious vow.25 A sinister passage in Persius’ Satires (5.179-88) depicts a 
fast-moving panorama of foreign religious practices (Judaism, Cybele and Isis worship) 
likely to impress upon the mind the disease of superstition.26 The closest precedent to 
Juvenal’s satire of superstition in Satire 13, though, is the lengthy series of fragments of 
Seneca’s lost De Superstitione preserved by Augustine, in which the Stoic mocks those 
who, for lack of a philosophical knowledge of God, cling to empty and excessive 
religious ritual. In one satiric vignette, he describes those who perform prayers to the 
Capitoline Triad on the Capitol. Like those mocked by Lucilius, they seem to treat the 
statues as real: some act as hairdressers for the gods, others put on a pantomime act for 
them. Still others implore the gods’ help in their legal cases:  
 
 sunt qui ad vadimonia sua deos advocent, sunt qui libellos 
 offerant et illos causam suam doceant (frag. 36 Haase = frag. 69 Vottero). 
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 There are those who beseech the gods to post bail for them; there  
 are those who offer up their writs and tell the gods about their legal 
 cases.  
 
Behind the comic exaggeration of Seneca’s diatribe lurks an epigraphically attested 
reality, of pleas to the gods to intervene in worshippers’ legal cases to guarantee justice 
(Versnel 1991). People frequently turned to the gods for assistance precisely because 
legal agreements were so frequently solemnized with an oath, which would involve the 
gods in legal affairs. Yet, as it will be later in Juvenal’s thirteenth Satire, this normative 
aspect of Roman practice is castigated as superstition by the Stoic. It is vanus furor (“idle 
madness”), he says, a practice not “foul or disreputable” (turpem nec infamem), but 
simply “useless” (supervacuum, frag. 37 Haase = frag 70 Vottero).  
 
In Juvenal’s own period, Plutarch offered a particularly detailed vision of superstition in 
his De Superstitione, contrasting it with an opposite religious extreme: atheism. Both 
positions arise, he says, out a “lack of learning and knowledge” about the gods (164E), 
giving rise to errors that obscure the philosophical principles of proper religion.27 
Atheists conclude from false reasoning that the gods do not exist. The superstitious know 
that the gods are real, but mistake their benevolence for a desire to cause “pain and harm” 
to human beings (λυπηροὺς καὶ βλαβερούς, 165B). Atheism leads to indifference 
(ἀπάθεια, 165B), but superstition leads to a paralyzing terror that transforms any minor 
occurrence or trivial ailment into a harbinger of divine judgment (165B). Plutarch paints 
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a vivid picture of the deisidaimon unable to sleep for dreams of the gods’ punishments 
(165F), putting desperate stock in empty ritual (166A), and succumbing to morbid terrors 
of infernal punishment after death (167A). Yet the superstitious will rush at the slightest 
hint of trouble to those whom they treat as frightful enemies: the gods. The superstitious 
are both terrified of the gods and slavishly dependent on them. As Plutarch says, they 
“fear the gods and flee to the gods, flatter them and abuse them, pray to them and pour 
blame on them” (167E). If the smallest evil (μικρότατον... κακόν) befalls the 
deisidaimon, he will loudly bewail his situation and plead with the gods for assistance 
(168A). True religion, of course, lies as the Aristotelian mean between these two 
undesirable extremes (171F). But Plutarch also produces a neat argument to show that 
atheism is the better of the two evils. Which would you prefer? People spreading false 
rumors about you – that you are “fickle, changeable, quick to anger, eager to avenge 
everyday occurrences [ἐπὶ τοῖς τυχοῦσι τιμωρητικός], pained over minor problems 
[μικρόλυπος]” (170A)? Or people simply not knowing that you exist at all? In Juvenal’s 
thirteenth Satire, both the neurotic deisidaimon and the sardonic atheist come to dramatic 
life, but Satire 13 lacks the mediating central voice of Plutarch’s treatise. The critique 
arises instead from the very spectacle of religious argument, the detached observation of 
its characters antagonizing other with insults and complaints.  
 
2. CALVINUS: ANGER AND SUPERSTITION 
It has been conventional to identify the satiric flaw of Calvinus, the addressee of Satire 
13, as excessive anger. He blazes when his deposit is stolen, in grotesque disproportion to 
the amount of money he has lost.28 He is patterned on the comic type of someone who 
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rants and raves with no self-control, and one of his moments of direct speech reflects 
closely the complaint of a similarly flawed character in Seneca’s De Ira.29 Certainly he is 
angry. But the object of his outrage is quite specific, for although the poem’s speaker 
scornfully mischaracterizes the complaint as merely financial, Calvinus himself 
repeatedly harps on the religious aspects of the crime. His charge is that trust has been 
violated (fidei violatae, 6), since the deposit he entrusted to his friend was sacralized 
(sacrum, 15), presumably by an oath.30 “Are you complaining that ten thousand sesterces 
have been stolen in a sacrilegious fraud?”, asks the satirist contemptuously (note the 
emphasis on the enjambed sacrilega).31 Calvinus demands that the gods avenge this 
religious offense: “won’t there be any punishment for a perjurer and an irreligious 
fraud?”32 He cries out against the unmoving lips on a statue of Jupiter, claiming that all 
his sacrifices have come to naught if the god does not punish his enemy (113-119).33 Like 
the superstitious individuals mocked by Seneca in the De Superstitione, he pleads with 
the gods to resolve his petty legal problem. Calvinus is not satirized merely for his angry 
overreaction to the theft. He is satirized for his hysterical transformation of a minor crime 
into a grave religious offence, for his assumption that the gods will do his bidding, for 
rushing slavishly to statues for assistance and protection – in short, for his superstitio.  
 
In his outrage, Calvinus epitomizes a theological small-mindedness, a desire to invoke 
the gods to police his petty financial affairs. At lines 78-85, the satiric speaker taunts 
Calvinus by evoking the mindset of his enemy, the brazen perjurer, yet the passage also 
subtly suggests the insidiousness of deisidaimonia, the co-existence of audacity and fear:  
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  per Solis radios Tarpeiaque fulmina iurat 
  et Martis frameam et Cirrhaei spicula vatis, 
  per calamos venatricis pharetramque puellae  80 
  perque tuum, pater Aegaei Neptune, tridentem, 
  addit et Herculeos arcus hastamque Minervae, 
  quidquid habent telorum armamentaria caeli.  
  si vero et pater est, “comedam” inquit “flebile nati 
  sinciput elixi Pharioque madentis aceto”.   
   
He swears by the rays of the Sun and the thunderbolts of Tarpeian Jupiter,  
and the German-style spear of Mars and the arrow-points of Cirrha’s prophet, by 
the arrows and quiver of the girl huntress, and by your trident, Neptune, father of 
the Aegean, and he adds the bows of Hercules and the spear of Minerva, and 
whatever other weapons are available in the armory in the sky. If he’s a father too, 
he says: “may I eat the tearful cheek of my son, boiled down and braised in 
Egyptian vinegar”. 
 
These impious oaths are all of course an extravagant, disingenuous performance (76-7). 
But the speech is both ridiculous and sinister in its evocation of excessive religion. The 
vow to eat one’s own son – described here with morbid attention to culinary detail, as if it 
were less an outrage than a menu item34 – is practically an archetype of religious impiety. 
It recalls the desperate legacy-hunters of Satire 12.115-120, who are prepared to sacrifice 
their children to win favor from the wealthy, and foreshadows the Egyptian cannibals of 
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Satire 15.26-92, whose hideous feasts typify the threatening aspects of foreign cult. More 
subtly, the exhaustive catalogue of the gods’ weapons reflects a morbid fascination with 
their ability to do harm, hinting that fearful superstition lingers just below the surface of 
aggressive impiety. In the next section of the poem, the satirist describes another 
individual whose perjury more transparently conceals a fearfulness of the gods. He 
reasons with himself that he can safely break his oath because the gains of his crime 
outweigh any divine punishment (92-99), or because the gods’ punishment is slow (100-
2), or because it is indiscriminate (103-5), or because wrongdoing can be forgiven (102-
3). Cycling through these rationalizations, frantically discarding one after another and 
failing to convince himself, he quakes all the while with frantic fear: “this is how he 
strengthens a mind shaking with fright for his dreadful crime”.35 In his work “On the 
Slowness of Divine Vengeance” (De Sera Numinis Vindicta), Plutarch remarks on the 
brittleness of evil: like iron of poor quality, its hard resolve is easily broken (556C). 
Fearful superstition lurks often below the apparent resolve of the wicked. Those who 
have seen the poem as a false consolatio have stressed that the speaker’s truisms serve 
instead to taunt and provoke Calvinus further. More specifically, though, the speaker 
taunts Calvinus with a series of images of perpetrators that reflect back at him his own 
signal flaw: excessive superstition.  
 
In the final section of Juvenal’s poem (210-49), the speaker assures Calvinus that he will 
have his revenge – and, in a sense, he gives it to him, by depicting the hellish torments to 
which the perjurer will be subjected by his guilty conscience.36 Yet here most clearly the 
speaker paints an extended caricature of the superstitious person, prey to eternal paranoia. 
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Almost every detail finds some parallel in Plutarch or other ancient descriptions of 
superstition. Calvinus’ perjurer will be subject to ‘never-ending anxiety’ (perpetua 
anxietas, 211; cf. ταραχὰς ἀπαύστους, Plut. De sera 554B).37 He will be unable to sleep 
in peace and will see your “accursed image” (sacra… imago) in his dreams (217-22; cf. 
Plut. De superst. 165D-166C). He will grow frightened at thunder and lightning, thinking 
storms to be the expression of the gods’ wrath (223-8; cf. De superst. 165E). He will 
misinterpret any illness as the sign of divine vengeance (229-32; cf. De superst. 168C). 
Eventually the perfidus will be condemned or exiled for his crimes, and “you will rejoice 
in the bitter punishment of his hated name. Finally, you will gleefully admit that none of 
the gods [deorum, the emphatic final word of the poem] is deaf or blind”.38 These final 
lines have caused some confusion, since the satirist seems in the end to allow Calvinus to 
indulge his anger, having told him throughout the poem that this petty wrong is hardly 
worthy of it. But he is toying with Calvinus. He tempts the wretched deisidaimon to 
misinterpret the sentence of exile as a grandiose confirmation of divine punishment for 
his enemies’ wrongdoing. The lurid end of the poem aims to excite and expose its target’s 
comic weakness.  
 
One further point. Given this characterization, Calvinus’ name may also bear overtones 
of excessive religiosity. Many commentators have presumed him to be a fictional 
character, though there were certainly Calvini in Hadrianic Rome who could make 
plausible addressees – or rather targets – of the satire. Our Calvinus is at least sixty, and 
was born “when Fonteius was consul” (17).39 That birthdate seems too early for the 
famous philosopher L. Calvinus (or Calvenus) Taurus, teacher of Gellius and friend (or 
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perhaps student) of Plutarch, though if readers thought of Taurus’ works on anger and the 
control of the emotions it would give point to the ambivalent engagement with 
philosophical ideas in the poem.40 We could be dealing with C. Iavolenus Calvinus, 
prominent senator and favorite of Hadrian, whose time as praetor may explain the 
opening attack on a praetor’s corruption (2-4).41 Whichever person is implicated – and 
the text does not force us to choose – the name Calvinus (“Baldy”) nonetheless fits 
well.42 To be bald (calvus) in the Roman world was a sign of age, and the addressee is 
indeed caricatured as a senex (16-7). But calvus and its cognates were also used of the 
shaved head of religious devotees of Isis. So, Juvenal speaks of the “bald herd” (grege 
calvo, 6.533). Lucius walks around, in the final sentence of Apuleius’ Metamorphoses, 
with his “baldness exposed” (obtecto calvitio, 11.30.5). Indeed, one superstitiosus 
individual mocked in the poem convulses with terror (106) when contemplating the 
Egyptian goddess’ divine vengeance (“let Isis lay any verdict she wants on my body! Let 
her strike my eyes out with her enraged sistrum!”, 92-93). John J. Winkler wrote in 
Auctor and Actor that ‘a shaven head by itself, without further comment, instantly brings 
two things to mind for a Greek or Roman of the second century C.E.: an Isiac priest or a 
popular buffoon”.43 Baldy in Satire 13 may not literally be a cultic devotee or a 
performing clown (cf. 110, mimum agit ille), but his frantic insistence that the gods 
avenge the trivial wrong done to him makes him damningly reminiscent of both types. 
 
3. THE ATHEIST’S SARDONIC LAUGH 
As is typical of Juvenalian poetics, the speaking voice of the thirteenth Satires is not 
strongly or clearly individuated. Unlike his satiric characters, such as Umbricius (Satire 
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3) or Naevolus (Satire 9), or even his satiric addressees such as Postumus (Satire 6) and 
Corvinus (Satire 12), Juvenal’s own voice typically remains evasive, characterized by 
strong personal emotion but minimal personal information. Scholars of Roman satire 
have long since become accustomed to interpret this voice as a persona rather than as a 
direct, autobiographical expression of the poet himself, but the characteristics of that 
persona shift and remain inconsistent from poem to poem, never quite fleshed out as a 
unified identity, a “real” character. Indeed, it is frequently the points of inconsistency 
between speakers of different Satires that highlights their artificiality and offer a signal to 
the reader to view them with a certain distance and suspicion.44 Aspects of the poetic 
voice of Satire 13 – the needling questions, rhetorical hyperbole, aggressive cynicism, 
parody of myth45 – are certainly familiar from previous poems. But other aspects, 
especially the scornful dismissal of the sanctity of oaths, are pointedly inconsistent. 
While the mockery of superstitio had a long history within Roman satire, an upper-class 
Roman aristocrat insisting that an oath be upheld is far from a typical target of such 
attacks. This speaker goes uncomfortably beyond the likes of Lucilius and Seneca, 
pushing the voices in his poem into a contemporary cultural polarity recognizable from 
Plutarch’s De Superstitione. Just as Calvinus is portrayed as the standard type of the 
hysterical deisidaimon, the speaking voice is that of the scornful atheist, who mocks all 
that is sacred and demeans religious life. Presumably, as in Plutarch, a norm of simple 
piety is understood, but this mean is never articulated. Only the extremes remain: the 
escalating malice of the atheistic speaker, and the fury and paranoia of the superstitious 
Calvinus. The two spur each other on to more extreme positions in a “unique kind of 
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consolation drama” (Keane 2007, 34) – or, I would say, a spectacle of angry religious 
argument.  
 
Recently, Tim Whitmarsh has challenged the traditional notion that atheism remained 
more insult than identity in the ancient world. By the time of Juvenal in the second 
century, he writes, “atheism in the full, modern sense had acquired full legitimacy as a 
philosophical idea”.46 Although challenges to traditional images of the gods in Rome 
owed their diffusion to Cynic, Skeptic, and especially Epicurean ideas, he maintains that 
atheism nonetheless established itself as “a respectable philosophical position” (230) in 
its own right.47 Whitmarsh certainly demonstrates that the atheist was recognizable as a 
type in the Empire. But the evidence does not suggest respectability; rather, atheists were 
persistently associated with mockery and satire. In a catalogue of passages denying the 
existence of the gods, the doxographer Aëtius in the first century CE cites the mocking 
charge that divine mythology is mere “poetic blathering” (ὁ ποιητικὸς λῆρος) 48, along 
with lines of invective from Callimachus’ Iambi.49 Plutarch (De superst. 169D) says that 
when faced with religious celebrations or worship at temples, the atheist is liable to 
“laugh a mad, sardonic laugh [γελῶντα μὲν μανικὸν καὶ σαρδάνιον γέλωτα]” then mutter 
to his friends that the worshippers are “deluded and raving”. Apuleius, in his Apology, 
attacks his prosecutor Aemilianus as the kind of person who “considers it a piece of wit 
to mock religious matters” (facetiae sibi habere res divinas deridere, 56.3), and calls this 
hateful character a “Mezentius” after Vergil’s notorious contemptor divum (56.7). 
Apuleius’ use of this attack in court suggests that the charge of atheism still had the 
power to offend, and Christians in the later second century vigorously protested its 
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application to them.50 The atheist is certainly a recognizable type, but he is associated 
with the extreme and objectionable mockery of traditional religious practice.  
 
Yet the most extensive and startling atheistic polemic from the second century (not 
mentioned by Whitmarsh) is spoken by the satiric voice of Juvenal’s thirteenth Satire. For 
this speaker, any faith in the effectiveness of observing religious scruples is laughable 
naiveté:  
  nos hominum divomque fidem clamore ciemus  
  quanto Faesidium laudat vocalis agentem 
  sportula? dic, senior bulla dignissime, nescis 
  quas habeat veneres aliena pecunia? Nescis 
  quem tua simplicitas risum vulgo moveat, cum 35 
  exigis a quoquam ne perieret et putet ullis 
  esse aliquod numen templis araeque rubenti? (13.31-7) 
 
 Are we to cry out and invoke the good faith of gods and men, as loud as 
 Faesidius’ clients praising him while he pleads a case? Tell me – you codger 
 deserving of a bulla – don’t you know the allure of someone else’s money? Don’t 
 you know what laughter your naiveté arouses among the masses when you 
 demand from anyone that they refrain from perjury and consider that some 
 divinity exists in any temple or reddening altar? 
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Calvinus should reattach his bulla (33), the atheistic voice sneers, if he truly believes that 
religious sanctions will offer any curb to crime. The ancient scholiast on these lines 
softens their impact by understanding them as a remark on the futility of the wicked 
appealing to the gods for assistance, but the assault on religious thought goes deeper. 
Calvinus’ simplicitas lies in the conviction that there is any divine power at all in the 
temples and altars to which he appeals.51 The grammar of line 36 is oddly disjunctive – 
an apparently positive indirect command, putet, is joined by et to a negative one – yet it 
serves to make the reasonable insistence that people not break their oaths seem forced 
and strange; in navigating our way through the syntax, we have to decide what exactly is 
laughable and naïve. The seventeenth-century poet John Oldham (1653-83) adapted this 
section in such a way as to bring out the uncomfortable religious implications. Why, the 
satirist asks, “preach up a God and Hell, vain empty names,/ Exploded now for idle 
threadbare shams,/ Devis’d by Priests, and by none else believ’d,/ E’re since great 
Hobbes the world has undeceiv’d?”52 As Paul Hammond notes, Oldham’s irony is 
“carefully ambiguous, and deliberately disquieting to the reader”, an assessment that 
might be extended to the Juvenalian original.53 Hammond also cites the note on 13.31-7 
by the earlier translator Barton Holyday, who assures readers that Juvenal “speaks not as 
his own belief, but by way of Satyre, to express the Common Atheisme of those Times”. 
 
While Calvinus complains about perjurers who violate oaths, the speaker expands 
impiety into an entire worldview. “It’s just so easy and straightforward”, he asserts, “to 
disdain the gods as witnesses” (tam facile et pronum est superos contemnere testes, 
13.75).54 Like Apuleius’ Aemilianus, he considers it a piece of wit to mock religious 
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matters. His exaggerations are a persistent travesty of religious language. What day is so 
holy (tam festa dies, 23), he asks, that people do not commit crime? When someone does 
not violate their oath, their faithfulness is like a prodigy (prodigiosa fides, 62). An 
instance of good faith, he says, is a violation of the natural order, worthy of consulting 
sacred haruspicy books and conducting a purificatory sacrifice (62-3). The rare honest 
man is a monstrum (65); the lengthy catalogue of other horrifying natural abnormalities 
that occupies lines 65-70 shows that the satirist is “mocking traditional catalogues of 
portents”.55 Later, the atheistic voice taunts the superstitious Calvinus by describing, as 
an example of a more serious crime than oath-breaking (maiora… crimina, 144), temple-
robbing (147-149). Yet, with scornful dismissiveness, he says that stripping pieces of 
gold plate from gods’ statue would only be the act of someone committing “small-time” 
sacrilege (minor… sacrilegus, 150). Indeed, this minor-league desecrator is wont to do 
worse. “Would he hesitate”, asks the atheistic voice – “a man who’s accustomed to 
melting down entire statues of Jupiter?”56 Seneca mocks those who, for lack of 
philosophical knowledge about God, indulge in useless ritual. Juvenal merely mocks. But 
rather than seeing this as the puckish pseudo-philosopher engaging in fake consolation, 
we should view the speaker as impersonating the stock type of the scornful atheist, who 
deliberately discomfits his addressee – and, I would suggest, his audience – by an assault 
on conventional notions of piety. 
 
At other moments, when the satiric voice appears to endorse a link between divinity and 
oaths, he puts pious sentiments grotesquely out of shape. A key example is the account of 
Glaucus of Sparta, an exemplum that already had a rich history of tendentious 
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misapplication. In Herodotus (6.86), the story is this: a sum of money is entrusted to 
Glaucus by a Milesian, but when the man’s sons come to retrieve it, Glaucus lies, 
pretending not to remember the event and asking for three months’ delay in which to 
investigate the matter. He consults the Delphic Oracle about whether he should keep his 
oath or break it. The priestess delivers an oracle strongly stating the long-standing Greek 
injunction against breaking oaths (the final line is drawn from Hesiod’s Works and 
Days).57 Glaucus begs pardon, but his fate is sealed, and his future line is obliterated. The 
moral drawn by the priestess seems to warn sinners against both oath-breaking and 
improper consultation of the oracle: “to try the god and to commit the act have the same 
effect” (τὸ πειρηθῆναι τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι ἴσον δύνασθαι). Then the speaker of the 
fable, Leotychides, draws a second, more expansive moral: “so good a thing it is”, he 
warns, “not even to consider (διανοέεσθαι) doing anything with a deposit except 
returning it when asked”. This suits his rhetorical purpose – Leotychides is trying to 
convince the Athenians to return hostages to Aegina – but the narrative undercuts both 
his credibility (we have already heard that he suffered the destruction of his house for 
taking bribes and stealing silver, 6.72), and the effectiveness of the exemplum (the 
Athenians are unpersuaded, 6.87).58 
 
The structure of the Glaucus vignette in Satire 13.199-209 mirrors that of Herodotus, 
with the facts of the fable followed by a broad interpretation. The satirist begins with the 
response of the priestess that Glaucus will be punished for asking the Oracle whether he 
should “safeguard his deceit by swearing an oath” (fraudem iure tueri/ iurando, 201-2). 
In Herodotus, Glaucus instantly regrets his consultation and begs for pardon. In Juvenal, 
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Glaucus becomes yet another archetype of the superstitious person paralyzed by terror of 
the divine. “He returned the money”, says the speaker, “through fear, not morals” (metu, 
non moribus, 204). The sententia castigates him as much for his neurosis as for his oath-
breaking. Contrary to earlier assertions about how easy it is to inveigle the gods, the 
speaker declares that the oracle’s words proved true, thanks to an extravagant 
demonstration of divine vengeance. Because of the “mere impulse to do wrong” 
(peccandi sola voluntas, 208) Glaucus died, along with his children, and household, and 
relatives, “no matter how distantly related” (207). But the moral the speaker draws is 
surely untenably broad (209-10): “for people who contemplate any secret crime in their 
heads earn the charge of having carried it out”, he maintains.59 At least Leotychides 
constrained his advice to returning deposits. The notion that our innermost thoughts may 
be the object of divine punishment seems less a deduction from the fate of Glaucus (who, 
after all, was punished after both lying and impiously consulting the oracle) and more the 
deliberate hyperbole of the speaker, whose interest lies not in piety or impiety but in 
reducing Calvinus and other superstitiosi to a comic spectacle of abject fear. Rather than 
a conventional warning about the sanctity of oaths, the narrator and the addressee of 
Juvenal’s Glaucus anecdotes are caricatures, philosophical opposites at either end of the 
poem’s polarizing extremes. Yet perhaps the most striking aspect of the Satire is the 
poet’s seeming withdrawal from either side. In an era of heightened awareness of a 
multiplicity of different religious cultures jostling for acceptance and respectability 
within the Empire, Juvenal instead embraces satiric detachment, fundamentally 
suspicious of others’ emphatic, agonistic assertions of religious practice. 
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4. JUVENAL AND THE CROWDED EMPIRE 
As the strategies of the Satires become more oblique, and the satirist’s own voice 
becomes more indistinct, the poems manifest a skepticism towards those who attempt to 
articulate their own identities loudly, publicly, defiantly. Again and again in Juvenal’s 
poems, those who individuate themselves from a Roman norm in cultural, social or 
sexual terms are targeted for attack. But Juvenal’s own disappearance of view, and his 
own tendency to dissolve into a series of different voices, suggests that these attacks 
spring not just from conservatism but from some more fundamental antagonism with the 
expression of individuality within the Empire, an aversion to anyone proclaiming 
difference against the crowded social and religious spheres of Imperial life. Juvenal’s 
own unwillingness to individuate the speaking voice of his Satires reflects this 
ideological bias. There is a syncretistic suspicion of the singular in his very poetics. As 
Juvenal renounces indignatio and retreats towards his more abstract and indirect satiric 
approach, those who confidently announce themselves as Jews or Isis-worshippers, or 
followers of a particular philosophical school, or even those who insist angrily on fidelity 
to traditional Roman ritual, are represented in his poems as fanatics, victims of obscene 
excess, parodic embodiments of grotesque anger and emotion. In Satire 13, Calvinus is 
castigated for his absurd insistence that the gods pay attention to him, that his own wrong 
is singularly worthy of divine vengeance amid a wide world of wicked vice. Juvenal’s 
poem bears witness to an anxiety about a technique of identity fashioning of increasing 
importance in the Hadrianic Empire: the adoption of non-traditional Roman religion as a 
mode of expressing a kind of individualism separate from family and State religion. Jörg 
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Rüpke gives the name “religious deviance” to this phenomenon; in Juvenal it becomes 
just one more form of deviance targeted for attack.60  
 
The poem constantly corrects Calvinus’ misapprehension that he is a special case, worthy 
of the gods’ – or our – individual attention.61 The crime he has suffered is “not 
uncommon” (nec rara, 8) and “familiar to many” (multis… cognitus, 9). “Do you think”, 
the speaker taunts, “that you should be placed outside of the common stock, you precious 
thing?”62 He must understand how small his problem is. He lost ten thousand sesterces 
(71-2), but what if another person lost two hundred thousand (73-74)? Calvinus’ situation 
is merely drawn from “the middle of fortune’s heap” (e medio fortunae ductus acervo, 
10). His case is aggressively atomized as only a “particle” of life’s ills (particulam, 14). 
Instead, Calvinus should learn to think like the crowd. “What do you think other people 
think” (quid sentire putas homines, 5) about your charge of perjury? Don’t you know that 
your naiveté makes the “masses” laugh (risum vulgo moveat, 35)? Calvinus’ anxious 
insistence on the gods’ vengeance could only be justified only if his problems were 
entirely unparalleled – which, of course, they are not. “If you show me there’s no other 
crime so awful anywhere on earth”, the speaker promises, “I’ll keep quiet”.63 Individuals 
in the poem are repeatedly overwhelmed by images of immensity and magnitude; the 
humorously excessive catalogue of prodigies at lines 64-70 dwarfs the one holy man the 
poet has found by comparing him to, inter alia, a storm raining down stones, a swarm of 
bees, and a gushing river of milk flowing into the ocean. Satire 13 urges its addressee to 
place himself within the “common stock”, to moderate his outrage by seeing that he 
forms only a tiny particle in an immense Imperial world. The satirist works by 
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diminution, condemning articulations of identity or attachment to marginal groups that 
might otherwise be seen as expressions of individuality in second-century Rome.  
 
Most explicitly at 162-74, Calvinus is urged to see his minor personal problems from the 
birds-eye view of the Empire at large:  
 
  quis tumidum guttur miratur in Alpibus aut quis 
  in Meroe crasso maiorem infante mamillam? 
  caerula quis stupuit Germani lumina, flavam 
  caesariem et madido torquentem cornua cirro? 165 
  [nempe quod haec illis natura est omnibus una].  
  ad subitas Thracum volucres nubemque sonoram 
  Pygmaeus parvis currit bellator in armis, 
  mox inpar hosti raptusque per aera curvis 
  unguibus a saeva fertur grue. si videas hoc  170 
  gentibus in nostris, risu quatiare; sed illic, 
  quamquam eadem adsidue spectentur proelia, ridet 
  nemo, ubi tota cohors pede non est altior uno.  
 
Who is surprised at a swollen throat in the Alps, or a breast bigger than a fat baby 
in Ethiopia? Who has stood agape at blue eyes and blond hair on a German, and 
curls dampened and molded into spikes? [Surely it’s because they all share the 
same nature]. A Pygmy warrior charges at the sudden appearance of a noisy cloud 
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of Thracian birds; undersized against the enemy, he is soon snatched up through 
the air by hooked talons, and carried off by the savage crane. If you were to see 
this is in our people, you would shake with laughter. But there, where an entire 
cohort is no taller than a foot, no one laughs, though the same battles are seen 
over and over again.  
   
Taunting his addressee for his inability to put things into ethical perspective, the speaker 
presents the world through a visual distortion of perspective, a funhouse oscillation of 
size and shape.64 The Empire contains dizzyingly big breasts, tiny warriors, huge birds, 
small battles. As a consolatory technique, these lines are a mock-Senecan invocation for 
Calvinus to see his minor problems from a cosmic viewpoint.65 Perjury is as natural in 
Rome, we are told, as other aberrant phenomena are natural in other parts of the world. 
The lines also vividly evoke the vast heterogeneity of the Empire, of which the city of 
Rome is no longer truly center, but epitome. In the itinerant Hadrianic-era Satires, the 
Empire is not imagined as a grand expression of Roman power, but as a vast crowd of 
debased humanity, a farrago of peoples and places and gods, in which the individuality of 
Rome itself is diluted. Calvinus, an elite male of “no slender means” (7) with an 
aristocratic family name,66 who insists, albeit hysterically, upon the normative Roman 
practice of oath-keeping, is observed by the poem from just this detached, birds-eye view. 
He is characterized with a flaw, superstitio, that previous satirists and philosophers had 
associated with non-Romans and with the culturally marginalized (foreigners, women, 
slaves). The poem does not urge him to remember his ancestors, or the dictates of pietas, 
or a revered exemplum, or some other archetypal Roman ethical instruction. Instead he is 
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urged to put his problems into perspective by understanding that what is “natural” is 
merely a matter of place. From this expanded – or rather, decentered – perspective, 
Roman practice is not sharply demarcated. The Roman too is part of a crowd. The poem 
is less interested in articulating boundaries between Roman or non-Roman religion than 
in castigating the kind of angry, divisive, religious polemic against which Juvenal 
articulates his own ironizing, detached satiric approach.  
 
5. FERVOR AND FUROR   
How did the pressures of a contentious religious environment shape Juvenal’s satiric 
expression? What did it mean to write satire among a crowd of gods? This second-
century world seems to have generated in the satirist an antipathy towards those whose 
loud declarations of identity and community made them into newer, more passionate, 
more furious versions of his earlier satiric self. As Juvenal moves to the end of his career, 
his poems present increasingly monstrous visions of religious argument and conflict, 
climaxing with the vicious exclusivity of the Egyptian tribes in Satire 15 whose 
“immortal hatred” of each other’s gods leads to murder and cannibalism. In Satire 13, 
with his own godlike detachment, Juvenal stages and observes the escalating ira of two 
opposing and objectionable stock types, the atheist and the deisidaimon. Yet their strong 
convictions seem equally opposed to the evasiveness and indirectness of the satirist’s 
own voice. In this disorienting vision, even Calvinus’ insistence on traditional Roman 
religious practice emerges as foreign and strange. The alleged movement away from 
anger within the Juvenalian corpus can be reframed instead as a series of responses to a 
changing cultural environment, in which angry religious ira has become one disturbing 
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new avatar of satiric indignatio. Juvenal’s evasiveness is a deliberate rejection of that 
polemic. He targets those whose loud, overweening passions make them stand out from 
the crowd, and mocks those whose faith in absolutes he has long since left behind.  
         Boston University  
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1 This kind of legal situation, in which one person acts as a living safety deposit box for 
another person, seems to have been common in the ancient world: Crook 1967, 209-10. 
Cf. Ov. Ars am. 1.641-2, a list of basic ethical precepts that even faithless lovers should 
observe: reddite depositum; pietas sua foedera servet;/ fraus absit; vacuas caedis habete 
manus (“return a deposit; keep the pacts of pietas; don’t commit fraud; keep your hands 
clean of murder”). The theme is also prominent in declamation: Santorelli 2016 and 
2016b, 315-6.  
2 The reading can be traced to Pryor 1962, followed by Fredericks 1972, Morford 1973, 
Jones 1993, Braund 1997, Keane 2007, Hooley 2007, 126-8.  
3 The fifth book (Satires 13-16) can be dated to a point soon after the “recent” (nuper) 
consulship of L. Aemilius Iuncus, suffect consul in 127 CE (15.27).  
4 Previous studies of Juvenal and religion emphasize his hostility toward “foreign” 
religions and his skeptical parody of poeticized myth (Jefferis 1939, Weiss 1967), 
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without much specific sense of the second-century religious environment in which he was 
writing. One exception is Corsaro 1974, though few readers will find convincing his 
hypothesis that Juvenal, for lack of explicit condemnation, was secretly sympathetic to 
early Christian communities. Umurhan and Penner 2012 compare the first book of Satires 
and Luke-Acts, demonstrating that both texts ground their moral visions in images of 
movement in and out of Rome. 
5 Citations from Juvenal are from the text of Clausen 1992. Translations are my own.  
6 Frag. 39 Haase = frag. 72 Vottero: omnem istam ignobilem deorum turbam, quam longo 
aevo longa superstitio congessit… 
7 HN 2.5.16. The complaint that Rome has “innumerable” gods appears already in Cicero 
(Nat. D. 1.84), but occurs more frequently in the Empire: Petron. 17.5; Tert. Apol. 10.5; 
Arn. 3.38.4; Prudent. Apoth. 453. On the comic manipulation of this complaint in the 
dialogues of Lucian, see Kuin 2015, 326-48. The vision of the Roman Empire as a “world 
full of gods” is best known in modern scholarship through Hopkins 1999.  
8 Rüpke 2014, 109. 
9 8.185-6; cf. Minucius Felix (28.7) on the popularity of Epona at Rome.  
10 8.26-9: if he can find one nobilis who benefits the patria, he promises to cheer like the 
crowd in Osiris’ ritual of rebirth. By Juvenal’s time, traditionally “foreign” gods were no 
longer necessarily coded as non-Roman, especially outside Rome; cf. Beard, North and 
Price 1998, 338: “it was not only the Capitoline triad, but Magna Mater and Mithras, who 
could stand for ‘Roman’ religion in the provinces”. 
11 On Juvenal’s “crowd speech”, see Geue 2017, 251-69 and section four below.  
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12 15.35-8: summus utrimque/ inde furor volgo, quod numina vicinorum/ odit uterque 
locus, cum solos credit habendos/ esse deos quos ipse colit.  
13 Anderson 1962; Braund 1988, esp. 178-98. Keane 2015, 169-71 offers a useful 
revision of the standard line that the satirist moves away from anger towards the end of 
his career. As she observes, anger increasingly becomes an object of criticism in the 
Satires, but the poems themselves do not model any calm tranquility: the poet is “still 
performing, not reflecting on his text from the outside” (at 170).  
14 Versnel 1991; also Chaniotis 2004.  
15 So Scheid 2006 and 2016, 96-104, who refutes the assumption that infractions against 
piety were viewed with greater lenience in the Empire.   
16 The Greeks were “not yet ready to swear by someone else’s head” (nondum Graecis 
iurare paratis/ per caput alterius), so that, if they perjured themselves, another person 
would suffer the gods’ punishment: see Watson and Watson 2014, 82.  
17 Morgan 2015, 106. For the Satires’ preoccupation with oath-taking and oath-keeping, 
cf. also 1.115 (on the religious worship of Fides); 2.98 (mocking men who swear by 
women’s oaths); 5.5 (the satirist would hesitate to trust his interlocutor even if he were “a 
witness who had sworn an oath”, iurato… testi); 8.156-7 (Lateranus swears by Epona); 
16.35-6 (the power of the soldiers’ oath, the sacramentum).  
18 See Pervo 2006 for an exhaustive review of the evidence.  
19 Coulter 1940, 60-2 demonstrates Scriptural parallels for the injunction against 
withholding deposits (Lev. 5:2-5), though, as she says, the severity with which Roman 
law dealt with deposits must also have shaped the sentiments in the passage. For 
comparable passages in second-century Christian texts, cf. Aristides, Apology 15 
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(Christians never embezzle what is held in a pledge); Epistle to Barnabas 19.11 
(Christians keep what they have received, neither adding nor taking away). Fee 1988, 
160-1 observes that the metaphor of Timothy’s Christian duty as a “deposit” (παραθήκη, 
1 Tim. 6:20) alludes to this same economic ideal.  
20 Gordon 2008, 84. 
21 The superstitious man of Theophrastus’ fourth-century BCE character sketch (Char. 
16), for example, is distinguished by eccentric behavior: he constantly sprinkles himself 
with water from a shrine, stops dead when a weasel crosses the path in front of him, 
forever believes he is cursed, thinks every dream is a divine omen, and so on.  
22 Among many works on the superstitio/ religio distinction in Roman thought, see 
Calderone 1972, Martin 2004, Rüpke 2016, 1-9. For Christian rejection of the charge of 
superstition, see Gray 2003, who argues that the author of Hebrews defends his 
community by critiquing the excessive performance of ritual, while still articulating his 
own non-superstitious notion of reverent fear (εὐλάβεια). 
23 Egyptian religions: Tac. Hist. 4.81. Judaism: Sen. frag. 41-42 Haase = frag. 73 Vottero; 
Tac. Hist. 5.8; Epistle to Diognetus 1.1, 4.1. Christianity: Plin. Ep. 10.96.8, 9; Tac. Ann. 
15.44; Suet. Ner. 16.2.  
24 Haynes 2003, 120; Gordon 2008.  
25 On this passage, see Muecke 1993, 162-4. The Stoic Balbus in Cicero’s De Natura 
Deorum 2.72 derives the word superstitio from the practice of those who spend “entire 
days praying and sacrificing so that their children might survive them” (liberi superstites 
essent). Cf. Lucretius’ satirical vision of the impotent man ‘harrassing’ the gods (fatigant) 
with endless, useless sacrifices.   
 39 
 
26 See Reckford 2009, 122-3, particularly helpful on a difficult passage.  
27 Van Nuffeln 2011, 70. On this text, see also Moellering 1962 and Bowden 2008. I 
quote from the edition of Laurenti and Santaniello 2007.  
28 Calvinus’ grief is “excessive” (nimios, 11) and absurd (“you’re ablaze, your insides are 
frothing up”, spumantibus ardens/ visceribus, 14-5), and strongly reminiscent of 
Juvenal’s own persona in his earliest extant poems (“why should I describe the intensity 
of anger that sets my dry liver ablaze?”, quid referam quanta siccum iecur ardeat ira, 
1.45).  
29 Cf. De Ira 2.32.1: at enim ira habet aliquam voluptatem et dulce est dolorem reddere. 
Minime… (“‘But surely anger has a certain pleasure, and it is sweet to avenge pain?’. 
‘No…’”); Juv. 13.180-1: “at vindicta bonum vita iucundius ipsa”./ nempe hoc indocti… 
(“‘But revenge is a good more pleasing than life itself’. Yes, that’s what fools say…”). 
On the connections between the De Ira and the thirteenth Satire, see Braund 1997, 84-7.  
30 Ferguson 1979, 295: “sacrum, i.e. entrusted under oath”. The collocation sacrum… 
depositum seems to be without parallel in Classical Latin, although sanctum can be 
paralleled with the sense “guaranteed” (Fugier 1963, 181).  
31 13.71-2: intercepta decem quereris sestertia fraude/ sacrilega.  
32 13.174-5: nullane peiuri capitis fraudisque nefandae/ poena erit? 
33 Cf. Plut. De superst. 167D. Anguish over the muteness of the gods: Versnel 1981, 37-
42.  
34 Sinciput is used of the meat from an animal’s head (Pers. 6.70, Plin. HN 8.77.209). 
Elixus is extremely common in Apicius of boiled meat; cognates of madere (“dripping”) 
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are used in that work of marinating or braising (see, e.g. the recipe for braised hare, lepus 
madidus, 8.8.1).  Ficca 2009, 87 points also to the culinary use of vinegar.  
35 13.106-107: sic animum dirae trepidum formidine culpae/ confirmat.  
36 For Roman conceptions of conscience, see Fulkerson 2013, 41-3, and the references 
there cited. On the humor of the passage, cf. Edmunds 1972, 63, who remarks that 
Juvenal’s “extreme exaggeration of the force of conscience” is not to be taken seriously.  
37 Cf. Scheid 2016, 115: “To yield to anxiety and thus to grant the gods power without 
limit or justification would be to fall into superstitio, which amounted to a feeling and 
form of conduct that was the opposite of true piety”.  
38 13.247-9: poena gaudebis amara/ nominis invisi tandemque fatebere laetus/ nec 
surdum nec Teresian quemquam esse deorum. 
39 There were consuls of this name in 58, 59, and 67: Astbury 1977.  
40 Cf. 13.19-22 and 120-3 (dismissing the usefulness of philosophical learning), and 184-
7 (invoking philosophers as exempla). Taurus on anger: Gell. 1.26.3; cf. Dillon 1977, 
237-247; Holford-Strevens 2003, 90-7. On the form of the name, see Luck 1980, 377-78.  
41 He is also suggested by Ferguson 1987, 43-4. I see no reason, with Reeve 1983, 30, to 
delete these opening four lines as an interpolation. An inscription (CIL 14, 2499) gives 
Iavolenus’ name and political posts, including tribunus plebis candidatus and praetor 
candidatus under Hadrian then suffect consul at an unknown date. If born Fonteio 
consule, he would be holding these posts unusually late, as a senex, which suits the 
characterization in Satire 13. Calvinus’ eye-catching polyonomy on that inscription – he 
is called C. Iavolenus Calvinus Geminus Kapito Cornelius Pollio Squilla Quintus 
Vulkacius Scuppidius Verus – is not unknown in honorific inscriptions under the Empire, 
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and the occurrence of a praenomen (Quintus) amid a sequence of cognomina is also not 
unparalleled (Salomies 2014, 514-15). But as the reader for CP suggests to me, it may 
nonetheless match the picture Juvenal gives: perhaps he is someone anxious to “cover all 
bases”? 
42 “Baldy” is the apt rendering of Keane 2015, 175. Roman wits were alive to the name’s 
etymology: cf. Cic. Att. 14.2.3, where the word φαλάκρωμα (“bald-headed one”) is used 
to refer to C. Matius Calvenna. Cf. Kajanto 1965, 235 on the frequency of cognomina 
relating to baldness.  
43 Winkler 1985, 226.  
44 Uden 2015, 169-75.  
45 On the last cf. especially 2.152, in which the speaker says that only “children” believe 
in myths of the Underworld; on the “critical-rational Skepticism” of these lines, Pollmann 
1996, 486.  
46 Whitmarsh 2015, 213. 
47 On the question of who qualified as atheist in ancient texts, see Winiarczyk 1984 and 
1992.  
48 De Placitis 1.7.3 (= Runia 1996, 546). Who makes this charge? Whitmarsh 2015, 213 
assumes that it is Aëtius himself, but Runia calls the abrupt shift in this section “the 
greatest difficulty” in this portion of Aëtius’ text (573). It seems most natural to take it as 
the sentiment of the speaker in the immediately previous section, that is, Sisyphus in a 
tragic fragment ascribed by Aëtius to Euripides (= TrGF 1 [43] F 19, attributed instead to 
Critias by Sextus Empiricus).  
49 De Placitis 1.7.1 (= Runia 1996, 546).  
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50 See Walsh 1991. Second-century Christian protest against the charge of atheism: 
Justin, Apol. 1.6.1, 1.13.1, 2.8.2; Martyrdom of Polycarp 3.2, 9.2; Athenagoras, Apol. 4.  
51 Schol. ad. Juv. 13.31 (Wessner 1931, 201).  
52 Oldham, “The Thirteenth Satyr of Juvenal, Imitated” (1682-3), excerpted in Winkler 
2001, 94. 
53 Hammond 1983, 163. 
54 The line becomes even more irreverent, as Pryor 1962, 173-4 noticed, by its similarity 
to the obscene 9.43 (an facile et pronum est agere viscera penem). The obscene context 
carries over into Satire 13 in the pun on the lines’ final words (penem/ testes; cf. Adams 
1982, 67).  
55 Courtney 1980, 545. 
56 13.153: an dubitet solitus totum conflare Tonantem? The line is bracketed in Clausen’s 
text, but, as Courtney 1980, 553 remarks, its specificity makes it an unlikely 
interpolation, and Ficca 2009, 121-2 convincingly defends it. That a minor sacrilegus 
would commit such a grave offense is deliberately unexpected, a typical Juvenalian shock 
at the climax of the section.  
57 Op. 285; Hunter 2014, 250-2.  
58 So Lateiner 2012, 166-68. Harrison 2000, 118 suggests that, contrary to the fable’s 
warning, the Athenians suffer no divine punishment for perjury, so the “moral of the 
story may then be precisely that moralizing is useless”. Glaucus is frequently invoked as 
paradigmatic oath-breaker in the Imperial period: Paus. 2.18.2; 8.7.8; Plut. De sera 556D; 
Dio Chrys. Or. 74.15. 
 43 
 
59 13.209-10: nam scelus intra se tacitum qui cogitat ullum/ facti crimen habet. Ullum in 
the final position of the line is emphatic, as ullis was in line 36; the atheist antagonizes by 
speaking in absolutes.   
60 Rüpke 2016. Such an antagonism, it is worth emphasizing, does not spring from a 
simplistic notion of Roman self versus non-Roman other – or perhaps could not, in the 
second-century religious environment described by Rüpke, when expected equivalences 
between Roman identity and traditionally “Roman” religion were no longer assured. On 
dissolving boundaries between Roman and non-Roman in the Satires, see Uden 2015, 
206-15, Larmour 2016, 26-37, Umurhan 2018, 118-27.  
61 In this paragraph, I am greatly indebted to Geue 2017, who argues that Juvenal’s later 
poems again and again warn addressees of the dangers of attracting conspicuous 
attention. In Geue’s insightful analysis, the Satires offer a timely example of effacing 
one’s identity and speaking anonymously from the crowd.  
62 13.140-1: ten, o delicias, extra communia censes/ ponendum? 
63 13.126-7: si nullum in terris tam detestabile factum/ ostendis, taceo.  
64 Morford 1973, 31-2.  
65 On the Senecan technique, see Williams 2012.  
66 “Calvina” is used for the character type of an aristocratic woman at Sat. 3.133, with 
possible reminiscences of a number of historical women: Ferguson 1987, 43.  
